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A CASE IN POINT

and ROGER D. BLAIR* *

Of late, environmentalists increasingly bemoan the use of our environment
as a convenient place to dump garbage. Moreover, as industrial production
soars and the rural population disappears into the sprawling, coastal megalopolises, environmental pollution becomes ever more apparent in various
respects. Lake Erie, for example, is dead and that is regrettable. Economic
costs, however, would have had to be imposed on society to keep it alive so
that in an economic sense, Lake Erie might well have been used properly.
Similarly, the Hudson River, although offensive to both sight and smell, may
have been used optimally. The current air quality in New York, Los Angeles,
and Gary may also be appropriate in an economic sense. If a case is to be
made for pollution control, it must be made in part through economic analysis.

Ecologists correctly point to the damaged environment, but it is also appropriate to consider the "price" society would have to pay to avoid or
mitigate the damage. The price would be drastically reduced levels of production and consumption. Thus, the appropriate way to evaluate the current
state of affairs concerning pollution is to compare the costs to society of
damaging the environment with the costs of saving the environment. This
article relies on economic analysis to confront the issue of whether the environment has been used in an economically optimal manner. In particular, it
concentrates on two basic issues involved in today's pollution problem: the
economic and legal aspects that necessarily arise in attempting to cope with
the economics of pollution. Initially, air pollution is examined as an economic
phenomenon, and then through legal means of dealing with the problem.
THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM

One of the fundamental assumptions underlying economic analysis is
that economic agents (firms and consumers) act in their own economic selfinterest. The firm attempts to maximize its profits while the consumer attempts to maximize his psychic satisfaction. If all markets are effectively
*Ph.D. in Economics, 1953, University of California at Berkeley; Professor of Economics
and Dean of the College of Business Administration, University of Florida; Member of
President Nixon's Price Commission.
**Ph.D. in Economics, 1968, Michigan State University; Assistant Professor of Economics,
University of Florida.
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competitive in the economic sense, the result of all decisionmakers attempting
to maximize their private benefits will be the production of the kinds of commodities consumers want. In addition, such commodities will be produced
in the proper quantities and in the most efficient manner. In doing this, the
firm will employ productive resources until the value of the incremental
addition to output of hiring an additional unit is just equal to the cost of
that unit of the productive resource. If every firm operates in this manner,
and if the price of the productive resource is the same in all uses, the last
unit of each productive resource will have the same value in producing output. Thus, the price of each unit of productive resource measures the cost to
society of using that resource in a given occupation by the value of the output that is foregone in alternative employments.
Consumers act so as to maximize their psychic satisfaction from a given
money income by selecting the proper mixture of commodities available to
them. In order to reach this position, the last dollar spent on any commodity
must yield the same incremental addition to their psychic satisfaction as the
last dollar spent on any other commodity. If all consumers act in this way,
the price of each commodity will reflect its value to society in terms of satisfying consumer wants. As a result, the value of incremental units of each
commodity to the consumer is exhibited by its relative market price.
Consumers and firms, acting together in the manner described, will insure
that the prices of commodities and productive inputs correctly indicate their
respective contribution to social welfare. Implicit in this analysis are two
ethical considerations: (1) that the distribution of income is socially correct; and (2) that resource allocation should be determined by consumer
preferences. The latter is the "individualist ethic," which is generally accepted.
The former, however, is most decidedly a debatable point. Of course, the way
to correct a socially unsatisfactory income distribution is through monetary
transfers. Finding the precise mechanism for achieving such an end, without
upsetting proper incentives, is not an easy task. The point, however, is that
a competitive market structure is a decentralized decisionmaking system that
leads to proper resource allocation for given resource endowments.1
When this idealized model breaks down we experience "market failure. There are many sources of market failure in the real world: lack of full
mobility of resources, resistance to change, uncertainty, lack of perfect information, and technological conditions that do not permit competitive
markets to survive. Another source of market failure, central to our discussion, carries the inelegant title of "externalities." Air pollution is a prime
example of an externality or, more specifically, an external diseconomy. Air
pollution amounts to injecting a new element of the universe into the realm
of scarcity.3 During the early stages of economic growth, the assimilative

1. For a discussion of welfare economics see Bator, The Simple Analytics of Welfare
Maximization, 47 AM. ECON. Ra,. 22 (1957).
2. The sources of market failure are described and analyzed in Bator, The Anatomy of
Market Failure,72 Q.J. ECON. 351 (1958).
3. This exceptionally clear definition of air pollution is attributed to Lerner, The 1971
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capacity of the atmosphere was sufficient to accommodate the waste residuals
of productive and consumptive activities. The air pollution that is obvious
to the most casual observer is ample evidence that residual wastes have now
exceeded the atmosphere's assimilative capacity.
No malfeasance has created this social problem. So long as the atmosphere
could not be overused by firms and consumers, there was no scarcity problem.
Thus, use of the atmosphere properly carried a zero price. However, once
the assimilative capacity of the atmosphere is exceeded, its use for dumping
residual wastes conflicts with other uses. In the absence of some method for
rationing its use, the atmosphere will be used by all as they wish. Unfortunately, when this occurs a basic asymmetry arises: as long as air is used for
seeing through and breathing, there is no impact on its other uses, but when
used for dumping residual wastes, the value of the atmosphere is reduced in
other areas. In instances involving conflicting demands on the services of
society's resources, the issue is usually resolved through the market mechanism,
which insures that the resource is allocated to the employment yielding the
greatest benefit to society. For example, in bidding for managerial talent, the
firm expecting to derive the most benefit from the services will be willing and
able to pay the higher price. Consequently, the effective operation of markets
insures that resources tend toward their most useful (that is, highest-valued)
employment.
Since there has been no market for the services of the atmosphere, its
price has been zero, which, in turn, has led to a non-optimal allocation of
the supply of air to different uses. In effect, any given firm, in attempting to
maximize profits, has used a resource without paying for it. The cost to society
of this use is the reduction in value that the atmosphere has for other uses.
In other words, the private costs (determined by the market prices of productive inputs) of the firm have diverged from the social costs of production.
Since society benefits most when resources are allocated optimally, it is
desirable to have some allocative mechanism to insure that society obtains
the maximum benefit from any given sacrifice in the quality of the atmosphere.
Such a mechanism can take many forms, but each will operate with varying
degrees of success. To select the least offensive procedure requires an investigation of the properties of each.
Consistent with most theoretical concepts in economics, early discussions
of externalities were filled with errors, inconsistencies, and semantic difficulties. Recently, a dearer picture has emerged. The last decade has seen a host
of articles on the subject in professional economics journals. Some of these
have improved and clarified the definition, while others have focused on
methods of correcting the resultant resource misallocation. In responding
to real world problems, economists have relaxed restrictive assumptions and
are gradually expanding their models. In this manner the models come
closer to dealing with the existing problem. In the fact of real problems and

Report of the President's Council of Economic Advisers: Priorities and Efficiency, 61 Am.
EcoN. REv. 527 (1971). See id. at 528.
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socio-political pressures, however, policymakers must deal with current problems now and not eventually. This may often lead to expedient solutions,
which are imprecise, but nonetheless move society in the proper direction.
This issue will be taken up later, but first several familiar proposals will be
examined for correcting the resource misallocation.
Tax/Subsidy Solution
This approach has a certain appeal, since an equilibrium is created when
the appropriatetax is placed on the polluter and the tax receipts are paid to
those suffering the pollution. 4 The polluter receives a benefit from polluting
just equal to the tax, and the "pollutee" receives a payment just great enough
to compensate him for suffering the pollution. This procedure works quite
well in a two-party situation because the proper tax can be determined
through an iterative procedure. For the real world, in which there are many
sources of pollution and many people who suffer the pollution, determining
the appropriate tax is much more difficult. In fact, precise results are impossible.
BargainingAgreements5
Regardless of the legal status quo, it is theoretically possible for the polluter and pollutee to reach a satisfactory agreement on the amount of
pollutants to be emitted. The bargains would involve some sort of collateral
payment between the parties. It should be expected that while the terms may
be quite different, the solutions will bear a striking resemblance to the
taxation scheme previously discussed. Indeed, the two are mathematically
equivalent. As with the taxation scheme, this procedure works only in a twoparty situation. When the damaging effects of air pollution are widespread
and diffused over a large number of pollutees, and it is difficult to identify
the polluters due in part to their large number, the creation of adequate
bargaining is highly unlikely.
Merger Solution
This approach envisions a merger of the polluter and the pollutee so that
the externality will be internalized.6 The idea is that subsequent decisions

4. The tax subsidy solution is discussed by Buchanan & Stubblebine, Externality, 29
ECONOMiCA 371 (new ser. 1962); Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 2 J. LAw &cEcoN. I
(1960); Davis & Whinston, Externalities, Welfare, and the Theory of Games, 70 J. PoLEcoN. 241 (1962); Davis & Whinston, Some Notes on Equating Private and Social Cost, 32
S. ECON. J. 113 (1965).
5. For a discussion of bargaining see Coase, supra note 4. See also Davis & Whinston,
Some Notes on Equating Private and Social Cost, 32 S. EcoN. J. 113 (1965).
6. The merger solution was suggested by Coase, supra note 4. See Davis & Whinston,
Externalities, Welfare, and the Theory of Games, 70 J. POL. EcoN. 241 (1962); Mishan, Reflections on Recent Developments in the Concept of External Effects, 31 CAN. J. ECON. S
POL. Scm. 3 (1965).
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by the polluter will explicitly include the deleterious effects imposed upon
the pollutee. This procedure makes the greatest sense when the two parties are
firms that are strongly connected through technology. Considering the enormous number of people who object to air pollution caused by automobiles,
this approach is not viable. A merger of their interests can hardly be envisioned. Efforts in this regard are doomed to failure because of the central
problem of all collective action: each individual's contribution to the success
of the group is so small that there is an incentive for each individual to allow
the others to bear the burden. This is especially true when everyone benefits
from group success, that is, when noncontributors cannot be excluded from
enjoying the fruits of the efforts of others.7
s

PollutionStandards
To this point, the solutions envision means of making the polluter recognize the social costs of his actions rather than the smaller private costs. Another possibility exists - the state can establish limits on how much pollution
will be allowed. Unfortunately, this procedure has little to recommend over
some of the others, and creates problems of its own. First, prescription of
a "proper" pollution standard should ideally be based upon knowledge of
exactly how a change in the level of pollution affects the respective real costs
to pollution sufferers. Moreover, the state's actions fall uniformly on all producers of pollution. But society receives differential benefit from the activities
that result in pollution. Those activities yielding smaller benefits from polluting should be allowed to pollute relatively less than others. In addition,
the pollution standards approach does not encourage those who can reduce
pollution cheaply to reduce pollution by any more than those for whom it is
more expensive.
PrivateDamage Actions as a Solution
It has been suggested that use of private damage suits may be a way of
insuring the optimal use of the atmosphere. For litigation to be feasible,
property rights in the atmosphere must be defined so that polluters are liable
for damages to others using the environment. If the results of litigation are
to be socially efficient, the definition of damages must be very precise in
economic terms. Unless the law is framed properly, society may be worse off
than with no legislation at all.
For example, in Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co.9 an injunction was
issued that restrained Union Bag from polluting a stream, which ran through

7. There is extensive literature that analyzes this type of commodity. See, e.g., Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REv. ECON. & STATISTICS 387 (1954).
8. Establishment of pollution standards has not received much support from welfare
theorists. For some of the problems that standards pose with regard to water pollution
see A. KNEESE & B. BOwER, MANAGING WATATERQUALITY: ECONOMICS, TECHNOLOGY, INSTITUTIONS (1968).

9. 208 N.Y. 1, 101 N.E. 805, 129 N.Y.S. 541 (1913).
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Whalen's farm. Union Bag had an investment in excess of $1 million and
employed over 400 people, while the harm to Whalen amounted to some 100
dollars. So long as it remains possible for Union to make some sort of payment to Whalen rather than be forced to install pollution control equipment,
this solution is economically satisfactory. On the other hand, if Union is
forced to install pollution control equipment and the cost of operating it
exceeds the harm done to Whalen, then the solution is detrimental in an
economic sense.
More importantly, even if the laws are flamed correctly, the results
of relying on private litigation are apt to be less than optimal due to
several factors. 10 First, suits between private parties tend to be cumbersome. If the anti-pollution laws are enforced precisely, or without some pragmatic rules-of-thumb, there are bound to be some delays. Such delays can cause
inefficiencies and result in irreparable damage. Second, to the extent that
damages are widespread and diffused, suits for full damages are extremely
difficult. Thousands of people, for example, may suffer the ill effects of air
pollution. This can make total damages enormous without making any suit
feasible, since the associated costs to any individual exceed the damages
suffered. Moreover, varying atmospheric conditions cause a given quantity of
air pollution to impose differential costs on society. This complication, of
course, applies to all methods of coping with air pollution, but it makes proof
of injury a thorny legal problem. Finally, the foregoing difficulties are compounded by the vagaries of judicial expression. Unless some per se rules
emerge," which will create difficulties of their own, legal standards are likely
to depend upon "reasonableness," "substantiality," and "intent."
GUIDELINES FOR AN IMPROVED PUBLIC POLICY

It should be noted that public policy may take various forms. One form
is to rely purely on private litigation to redress alleged injuries through
damage suits. As indicated earlier, this is not likely to represent an effective
means of dealing with the pollution problem. In fact, it is tantamount to no
effective public policy at all because of the difficulties in maintaining private
suits. Alternatively, public policy can entail various positive actions, such
as statutory prohibitions against certain acts, mandatory employment of pollution control devices, and financial inducements for the private development
of pollution control equipment. Ideally, the public policy selected will be the
one that deals with the problem in the most efficient manner.
The previous discussion has indicated that air pollution may be evidence
of market failure. Market failure, however, may not have occurred. Optimal
economic solutions for the correction of resource allocation require reducing
pollution to the proper (economically-justified) level. But adjustment of the
10. These factors that undermine reliance upon litigation are based upon experience
with water pollution. See A. KNEESE & B. BowER, supra note 8, at 85-87.
11. Per se rules would have to be in the form of absolute prohibitions. Such rules would
be undesirable unless they involved fines that properly reflected the resultant economic
injury. This would then undermine the per se aspect of the decision rule.
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quantity of air pollution to optimal levels also requires an expenditure of
resources. Accordingly, if the costs of adjustment vary with the output, these
costs must be subtracted from the social benefits that accrue as a result of
pollution reduction. - The net effect of this calculus is to raise the "optimal"
amount of air pollution. On the other hand, the adjustment costs may not
vary with the level of pollution, because they may be lump sum. In this
case, adjusting the level of air pollution must result in benefits that exceed
the lump sum cost for adjustment to be worthwhile. Thus, the presence of
air pollution does not establish a prima fade economic case that an adjustment should be undertaken.
There are, however, some compelling economic arguments that lower
levels of air pollution are socially desirable and appropriate. In urban areas
air pollution is generated by the productive and consumptive sectors. Typically, the primary offenders are industrial plants, which include power generating facilities and automobiles. Air pollution can be viewed as the result
of a large number of private decisions that have considered only the private
costs associated with their respective actions. External costs have been ignored.
Since the decisions of automobile drivers illustrate the problem, the automobile should be examined as a case in point. Automobile drivers function
in their role as consumers, and properly (in an economic sense) ignore any
difference between private and social cost. Each driver, however, might
prefer a lower level of air pollution. Action by any automobile driver to
reduce his driving will not occur because each driver does not contribute
enough to the total level of air pollution for his unilateral action to benefit
him by more than it costs him. If, however, each driver could be assured that
the others might be inclined to (or would be required to) take similar
measures, each might reduce his contribution to air pollution. Participation
in such a group effort cannot be strictly voluntary, because if each driver
recognized the rest of society's cooperation, he could enjoy a reduction in
air pollution without altering his normal consumption habits. Since this is
apparent to every driver, voluntary participation will be ineffective. If, on the
other hand, the coercive power of the state is used, then individual action can
improve the situation. 8
Ideally, public policy should be designed to yield precisely optimal resultsair pollution should be reduced to the level at which the social benefit of
pollution abatement is just equal to the cost of abatement. The urban pollution problem, however, is an example of what economists refer to as a "public
good." The unfortunate characteristic of public goods is that no one can be
excluded from the benefits of the public good. This means that the public
good, pollution abatement, should be provided until the sum of the individual

12. See Coase, supra note 4, at 2, 15-19, for
the presence of an externality.
13. Air pollution generated by automobiles
were analyzed more formally and in more detail
mobiles, Reciprocal Externalities, and Antitrust
meeting of the Southern Economic Ass'n).
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benefits is just equal to the social cost of provision. There is no mathematical
formula for determining the proper quantity of pollution abatement that
does not involve omniscience. Thus, public policy cannot yield perfect results.
This recognition is much easier to accept by non-economists than by economists.
A desirable level of pollution must first be specified. Then, the question
becomes how to achieve this level in the least expensive fashion. Public
policy alternatives can be evaluated on the basis of how well they conform
to three basic standards. First, public policy should reduce pollution most
where the social costs of pollution are highest. Second, public policy should
encourage those who can most easily reduce pollution to do so by more than
those for whom reduction is more difficult. Finally, public policy should create
the proper incentives for firms and consumers to cope with air pollution in
the most socially beneficial manner. These desirable effects of social policy
will not be fully met by any of the alternatives mentioned earlier. Analysis
of the public policy embodied in the Clean Air Act of 197014 will reveal some
deficiencies in the procedure adopted. Consideration of the discarded alternatives will reveal ways of improving pollution abatement.
LEGISLATION: THE CASE OF AUTOMOBILES

An impressive array of legislation has been enacted at the federal, state,
and local levels of government dealing with nearly every type of pollution.
Some laws prohibit certain actions, some clearly establish liability for the
polluter, some provide for assistance in reversing the ill effects of pollution,
while still others establish pollution standards. This article will describe
the air pollution problem caused by the use of automobiles and trace the
development of legislation aimed at this problem in order to illustrate its
economic aspects. The automobile pollution problem exemplifies the nature
of the economic problem, and the form legislation should take in order to
implement appropriate public policy.
Because of certain topographical and meteorological phenomena, the
United States can be divided into air basins. Air basins are bodies of air
that are distinct from other bodies of air. The precise boundaries of an air
basin cannot be sharply defined; one can expect that emissions into an air basin
will stay generally in that air basin. The Los Angeles area, for instance, has
been designated as an air basin by the California State Air Resources Board.
The high number of motor vehicle miles traveled per capita, coupled with
the topography and climate of the Los Angeles area, produced the first metropolitan smog problem. An air pollution control program was initiated by the
State of California in 1947. Its efforts were hampered initially by ignorance no one was sure what caused air pollution. In 1951 it was discovered that
smog resulted from a photochemical reaction between pollutants in the air
and the sun's ultraviolet rays. Prior to the acceptance of this theory the
automobile industry would not admit that automobiles contributed to air
14. 42 U.S.C. §§1857 et seq. (1970).
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pollution. Once this much was known and accepted by everyone, the problem
then became what to do about it.
As indicated earlier, part of the complexity results from the nature of
automobile-induced air pollution. All of society may agree unanimously that
a reduction in the level of air pollution is desirable. Collectively, it is within
society's power to do something about pollution because people are the ones
who are doing the polluting. Generally, group action is extremely difficult to
motivate and organize, and this is particularly true in this case. The group
goal is to reduce air pollution. Pollution abatement is the sort of "good" that
no one can be excluded from "consuming." Thus, the rational member of
the group may recognize that it is in his interest not to participate in furthering group efforts, since it is possible to benefit from the group's success
without incurring any costs. This is the reason group actions are generally
unsuccessful without some means of compelling participation.
As noted earlier, voluntary, unilateral action on the part of automobile
owners is not likely to produce significant results. No single driver can sufficiently affect the level of air pollution to significantly mitigate pollution.
There may be some individuals, so-called "do-gooders," who will impose
costs upon themselves to make a socially-oriented gesture. However, unless
there is an enormous number of such people, their efforts will only amount
to a gesture.
Finally, the options available to the concerned citizenry are very limited.
They could reduce the use of their automobiles and keep them well-tuned.
There were no other alternatives, and for the same reason that a simple thing
like a seat belt was unavailable for so long -there was no demand for it.
The automobile industry is willing to invest large sums in research and
development for any automobile option for which an adequate demand is
forecast. Because pollution control devices add to the cost of an automobile
without improving its style, convenience, or performance, the automobile
firms had no incentive to invest in developing a pollution control device.
Public policy with respect to automobile-induced air pollution evolved
from suasion to the adamant standards contained in the Motor Vehicle Air
Pollution Control Act and the Clean Air Act of 1970. Since the Clean Air
Act of 1970 pertains to automotive emissions, the Administrator does not
have the same discretion for establishing standards that he has for stationary
sources of air pollution. Dissatisfied with the meager progress that voluntary
efforts produced, Congress established severe pollution standards. Based upon
the standards for the emission of carbon monoxide and hydrocarbons for
1970 models, there is a mandatory reduction of ninety per cent by 1975.25
With respect to nitrogen oxide, based upon the average of the emissions of
1971 models, there must be a ninety per cent reduction by 1976.16 Of course,
such standards apply to all automobiles sold within the United States. At
first, this seems to be a dramatic way to reduce the air pollution resulting

15. National Emissions Standards Act, 42 U.S.C. §1857f-1 (b) (1) (A) (1970).
16. National Emissions Standards Act, 42 U.S.C. §1857f-1 (b) (1) (B) (1970).
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from automotive use. It appears that automotive-induced air pollution will
no longer be a problem by 1976. Irrespective of whether this public policy
will succeed, we must question its appropriateness.
First, establishing national standards is suspect when one considers that
adequate emission control systems are usually expensive. The present policy is
going to raise the price of automobiles substantially to all purchasers without
regard to the cost that each automobile imposes upon society. This means
that those living in areas that are essentially free of pollution will bear the
same burden of reducing pollution that those in polluted areas bear. In other
words, some people are paying for damages that they are not responsible for
causing. Since those who are forced to purchase unneeded pollution control
equipment do not have unlimited incomes, they are suffering a reduction in
the consumption of other commodities. It is clear that their psychic satisfaction must be reduced as a result. This is an unnecessary consequence of
relying upon pollution standards.
The establishment of standards is also improper when one considers the
different purposes for which automobiles are used. For example, the suburban
housewife with a compact automobile that is used for errands imposes much
smaller costs on society than the salesman or delivery man who drives his
automobile or truck nearly all day.
The deadlines in the Clean Air Act of 1970 must be met or the automobile manufacturers will have to stop production of cars for domestic sales.
Ignoring the political implications of this unlikely result, the 1970 Act offers
no effective incentive to beat the target deadline. The Act does not create a
demand for pollution control equipment; it merely forces automobile firms to
develop and install such equipment no later than 1975-1976. This means that
until that time the same conditions will continue to face the industry.
There are several alternatives to the establishment of standards. One of
these would be to create air basin control authorities to administer the
air quality within the basin. So long as air pollution was not a problem, the
authority would have no function. But should air pollution become a problem,
the authority would have the responsibility of developing a solution. One
means of correction would be a tax on automobile owners, which could be
a direct function of the automobile's pollution potential and the number of
miles the automobile is driven. The tax would be a kind of "air use" charge
analogous to the license fees that depend upon vehicle weight. The level
of the tax could be adjusted in some iterative fashion until the control
authority is satisfied that the proper air quality has been attained. This procedure would make it possible to tax heavy polluters more than light polluters.
It also adjusts the charge on the basis of the air quality - the tax is greatest
where the problem is greatest. Finally, this procedure would create a demand
for pollution control equipment since the tax could raise significantly the price
of automobiles. Once such a demand was registered, American industry would
develop the technology necessary to satisfy the demand.
Among the many additional ways to spur this development is the reduction of the tariff on foreign automobiles by different amounts, depending upon
the particular automobile's pollution emissions. Such a proposal would pro-

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol24/iss3/1

10

1972]

Lanzilloti and Blair: Some
Economic and Legal Aspects of the Pollution Problem--The
Aut
409
THE POLLUTION PROBLEM

vide an incentive to foreign automobile manufacturers to invest in pollution
control devices, and also provide a further incentive for United States firms to
make research and development expenditure for such devices.
CONCLUSION

This article has attempted to demonstrate the relevant economic relationships that should be considered in any assessment of the general problem of
pollution. The major considerations necessary for a sound economic approach
to the problem are the creation, preservation, and employment of economic
incentives wherever possible. Economists have warned repeatedly that attempting to legislate behavior that is not in the self-interest of the individual
is an exercise in economic futility. The more reliance put on economic incentives by public policy, the greater the probability of its success. In regard
to automobile air pollution as a case in point, public policy has been expressed
through the mandatory standards embodied in the Clean Air Act of 1970.
Since this expression of public policy does not exploit economic incentives, the
goal of pollution abatement could be better served.
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